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Large Portuguese firms  
from the Marshall Plan to EFTA:
Early stirrings of Managerial Capitalism?
— Eugenia Mata
The	second	half	of	the	1940s	and	the	1950s	was	simultaneously	the	period	of	 impact	
of	the	Marshall	Plan	on	the	Portuguese	economy	and	the	epoch	of	take-off	of	modern	
economic	growth	 in	Portugal.	 This	process	has	been	studied	 from	a	macroeconomic	
perspective,	but	not	 from	a	business	point	of	view.	This	 is	 the	purpose	of	 this	paper,	
which	examines	the	formation	of	new	firms,	and	studies	the	scale,	scope,	performance,	
ownership,	 structure	 and	 strategy	of	 a	 sample	 of	 the	 largest	 firms.	 It	 shows	how	 the	
Marshall	aid	and	the	government	commitment	to	promoting	economic	growth	and	sov-
ereignty	over	a	vast	colonial	empire	led	to	cooperation	with	family	firms	through	regula-
tion,	subsidies	and	planning.	The	related	and	unrelated	diversified-business	character	of	
informal	business	groups	escapes	Chandler’s	model	and	his	scale	and	scope	econo-
mies,	but	succeeded	in	providing	safety	and	mutual	assistance	among	firms	to	face	an	
increasingly	competitive	world.
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1. Portugal in the Golden Age of economic growth
The period of the Marshall Plan was a crucial moment for the take-off of 
modern economic growth in Portugal. This is true from a macroeconomic 
perspective, as the evidence of national accounting shows, and also from a 
microeconomic perspective, as this paper seeks to demonstrate. Several indus-
trial sectors flourished, and family groups prospered. The paper discusses if 
the period between the Marshall Plan and EFTA  accession may be envisioned 
as the first moment of managerial capitalism in Portugal. This was the oppor-
tunity for experiencing rates of growth that were higher than ever in the past, 
paving the way to an exceptional performance during the 1960s.
Although in the Usa the managerial revolution took place in the period 
between the 1880s and the Great Depression, bringing giant industrial 
corporations to the forefront of American capitalism, in the large European 
countries the First World War interrupted similar paths for different national 
profiles of managerial capitalism1. Occasionally conclusions from Chandler’s 
1	 A. Chandler Jr., 1990. 
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corporation model were advanced as a universal truth, while the structural 
contingency theory was presented as the instrument for the global and irre-
versible convergence of national economies that would adopt or implement 
such a powerful rational logic for businesses2. Abundant literature examines 
the distinct British, French, German and Italian types of ownership and man-
agement before 1914, in the inter-war period and in the aftermath of Second 
World War, while recent works approach these issues from a comparative 
perspective, particularly to discuss the so-called «types of coherent business 
system» of the twentieth-century capitalism, which include the American, 
German, French, and even Scandinavian varieties3. According to Djelic 
(1998) and Guillen (1994), Italy and Spain escaped the framework because of 
their political regimes. To what extent did diversified and multidivisional cor-
porations touch such a small and under-developed country, as was Portugal4? 
In presenting the Portuguese case to the academic community, this paper 
raises the discussion on small national cases. It introduces the period from 
the end of the Second World War to EFTA  adhesion as the first experi-
ence of modern economic growth, and presents the Portuguese firms of the 
1940s-1950s as the main actors of the successful performance. In trying to 
put Portugal in the agenda of the Chandlerian discussion, this paper focuses 
on the Strategy, Structure, Ownership and Performance analysis (SSOP) of 
the main Portuguese firms of the time, in comparison with papers on the Usa 
or developed European countries, using their annual reports and accounting 
as main sources for this purpose. As Judt (2005) reminds us, «In 1945, most 
of Europe was still pre-industrial. The Mediterranean countries, Scandinavia, 
Ireland and Eastern Europe were still primarily rural and, by any measure, 
backward»5.
This paper concludes that the first steps into industrial growth occurred after 
the Second World War, benefited from the Marshall Plan aid, and prepared 
the Portuguese economy to join the European Free Trade Association in 
the 1960s, a commitment with European integration that still protected the 
national economy from the adoption of a common external tariff, but which 
already opened the national market to the industrial competition coming from 
the EFTA  partners, while a managerial revolution was erupting in the largest 
firms. The instruments for this successful path toward the European economic 
integration were the business groups, which must be studied as hampering 
2	 On the limits to such an extension see L. Donaldson, 1996.
3	 The	whole	issue	of	Business History,	49,	4	(July	2007).	R.	Whittington	and	M.	Mayer,	2000,	pp.	78-79.	
4	 M.L. Djelic, 1998. M.F. Guillen, 1994.
5	 T.	Judt,	2005,	p.	327.
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related and unrelated-diversified business strategies in order to impair the dif-
ficulties to business growth in a small less-developed country such as Portugal 
in the 1940s and 1950s.
It was during the late 1940s and the 1950s that Portugal’s modern eco-
nomic growth definitively took off. According to Maddison (2001), in 1950 
Portuguese per capita gross domestic product was still slightly below the 
World average (98%) and by 1973 it already exceeded the World average by 
almost 80%6. Portugal, with a Gdp per capita of 2,068 dollars (G-K,1990), 
her closest Oeec partners were two more Mediterranean countries (Greece and 
Turkey) – in a group of relatively low-income countries. All other partners were 
above 3,000 dollars (G-K,1990). Gross domestic product figures published by 
the Bank of Portugal covering the years from 1953 on (Pinheiro, 1997) show 
real growth rates between 3.1% (1955) and 6.1% (1958) for the rest of the 
decade, allowing for real per capita Gdp growth rates between 2.4% (1955) 
and 5.2% (1958). Less sophisticated estimates for earlier years also published 
by the Bank of Portugal (Baptista et al., 1997) show that significant growth 
dated back from the immediate post-WWII years, with the only hiccup in the 
year 19527.
It is consensual among Portuguese economic historians that consumption, 
standards of life and welfare improved a great deal for the Portuguese in 
the next two decades, bringing increasing urbanization, particularly along 
the Atlantic coast, and a transfer of labor force from agriculture to industry. 
This was also a period of colonial development. Portugal ruled a vast empire, 
comprising extensive territories in Africa coming from the international agree-
ments of the Berlin Conference in the 1880s, and small territories in Asia 
(India, Macao and East Timor) coming from the previous Portuguese empires. 
Although the homeland was a small strip of land in Iberia and some islands in 
the Atlantic Ocean, the empire was a vast field of opportunities for colonial 
businesses. It is pointless to deal extensively with these macroeconomic aspects 
once more, as they have been the subject matter of several studies8. However, 
none of these studies examines the process in terms of the population of firms 
and the largest firms in the economy, their businesses, structure, profile and 
performance. This paper seeks to fill this gap.
6	 A. Maddison, 2001.
7	 M. Pinheiro (ed.) (1997). D. Baptista et al., 1997.
8	 A. Marques, 1988; A. Mateus, 1998; J.C. Neves, 1994; V.X. Pintado, 1964; M.E. Mata and N. Valério, 2003; P. 
Lains and Á.F. Silva (eds.), 2005.
124
Eugenia Mata
2.  Birth and death of firms in the Golden Age of Portuguese 
economic growth
The formation and extinction of corporation and partnership firms in 
Portugal, which are available from the beginning of the 1930s on, is an impor-
tant indicator of business dynamics. Table 1 summarizes this process from 
the early 1930s to the mid-1970s. Although individual firms are missing, it is 
possible to say that this provides a fair picture of entrepreneurial dynamism in 
the Portuguese economy.
Data show that gross and net formation of firms was sluggish during the 1930s, 
experienced a peak during the 1940s, slowed down during the early 1950s, and 
then gradually gathered speed until 1974, with a hiccup in the early 1960s. The 
unexciting situation of the 1930s may be related to the relative stagnation of 
the Portuguese economy during the decade of the Great Depression. Although 
it was not too bad a performance in the international perspective, the prices 
of colonial raw materials were greatly hurt by the decreasing global demand. 
The activity of the 1940s may be related to the speculative wave generated 
by the very peculiar situation of the Portuguese economy during the Second 
World War. As the country was neutral throughout the conflict, there was an 
exceptionally high positive overall balance of payments resulting from several 
elements. On the one hand, Portugal was a gathering point for refugees loo-
king for emigration opportunities to the Usa and significant invisible inflows, 
Tab.	1.	 Formation and extinction of corporations and partnerships
Period Formation of corporations 
and partnerships
Extinction of corporations 
and partnerships
Increase of corporations  
and partnerships
Number Capital
(106 escudos)
Number Capital
(106 escudos)
Number Capital
(106 escudos)
1930-1934 5,914 412 2,467 234 3,447 178
1935-1939 6,230 414 1,798 179 4,432 235
1940-1944 9,383 1,277 1,790 188 7,593 1,089
1945-1949 13,643 2,109 2,562 336 11,081 1,773
1950-1954 9,191 1,479 2,562 339 6,629 1,140
1955-1959 10,103 2,258 1,998 388 8,105 1,870
1960-1964 10,080 3,964 2,662 792 7,418 3,172
1965-1969 17,575 17,088 2,899 7,762 14,676 9,326
1970-1974 19,582 25,422 3,147 4,490 16,435 20,932
Note – Exchange rates: stabilization at 1 dollar = 22.5 escudos in 1931; slight depreciation of the escudo until 1933; significant 
appreciation of the escudo until 1940; 1 dollar = 25 escudos between 1940 and 1949; 1 dollar = 28.75 escudos between 1949 
and 1971; slight appreciation of the escudo between 1971 and 1975. Valério N., Portuguese Historical Statistics (Lisbon, INE, 
2001), Table 10.6­B, 738.
Source: Estatísticas Monetárias e Financeiras, INE, various years
125
large portuguese firms from the marshall plan to efta
especially from the American Jewish community to refugees flying from Nazi 
occupied Europe. Some of them remained in Portugal and the influx of savings 
and capital was a significant factor. On the other hand, the non-belligerency 
was coupled with high exports of crucial commodities, such as tungsten ore, 
to both sides in the conflict9. The gradual take off from the early 1950s to 
the mid-1970s mirrors the macroeconomic performance of the economy, the 
hiccup of the early 1960s being attributable to the hesitations generated by 
the outbreak of the colonial wars in Angola (1961), Guinea-Bissau (1962) and 
Mozambique (1964). The net increase in the number of firms in Portugal, 
from the Marshall Plan to the European Free Trade Association, was more than 
25,000, with almost 175 million dollars of capital.
3.  A sample of the largest firms
As no list of largest firms is available for the aftermath of the Second World 
War, such a list was constructed using a three-pronged approach. First used 
was the earliest available official ranking of firms, which was published in the 
early 1970s10. Second was the list of the largest Portuguese non-financial firms 
on the eve of the First World War, recently built by Pedro Neves in his doc-
toral dissertation11. Third, firms mentioned in texts of the 1947-1960 period 
as being among the largest Portuguese firms were added, to avoid the risk of 
missing important firms which were not in the 1914 and 1970s rankings.
Table 2 presents the list of the largest Portuguese non-financial firms in 1972, 
published by the official statistical office. They are ranked according to three crite-
ria (revenue, net worth and labor force). The list includes the ten largest, to which 
were added firms larger than 90% of the tenth largest, according to each criterion.
The largest Portuguese non-financial firms by assets on the eve of the First 
World War are listed in Table 3. As above, the list includes the ten largest and 
those with assets greater than 90% of the tenth largest.
Affiliates of foreign firms (Mobil, Plessey, Shell, and SE – Standard Electric) 
were excluded, as well as the firms present in the early 1970s list that were 
created during the 1960s (the electricity CPE – Companhia Portuguesa de 
Electricidade, the ship-repair Lisnave, and the engineering CT – Construções 
Técnicas), and the firms present in the 1914 list which had become extinct 
in the post-Second World War years (two railroad companies, CCFBA and 
CNCF, absorbed by another railroad company, CP, in 1947), or no longer 
9	 T. Judt, 2005, p. 83.
10	Principais sociedades. Lisbon, INE [National Institute of Statistics], various years.
11	P. Neves, 2007. 
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ranked among the others in the list (CCFP and CPF). At the same time three 
firms that appeared as larger than some others in the sample were added (the 
shipping CCN, the oil CPP and the electrical UEP). The list in Table 4 thus 
obtained of 20 domestically-owned firms should be considered.
The most striking feature of this list is perhaps the fact that a significant num-
ber of these firms were quite recent. As a matter of fact:
a. Six had been created during the period under consideration (that is to say 
between 1945 and 1960) – the air company TAP (1945), the oil prospector 
Tab.	2.	 Largest Portuguese non-financial firms in 1972
Revenue 106 escudos Net Worth* 106 escudos Labor Force Workers
SACOR 5,554 CPE 8,569 CP 24,121
TAP 4,009 CUF 3,566 TAP 8,140
CUF 3,682  SACOR 3,109  CUF 8,014
Shell 2,892  CCT 1,686  Lisnave 7,107
SN 2,883  ECL 1,384  CPE 4,534
Mobil 2,847  TAP 1,323  SN 4,203
CPE 2,311  Soponata 1,322  Plessey 4,16
Lisnave 2,044  CRGE 1,295  CT 4,131
CRGE 1,666  CNN 1,277  EFACEC 3,54
CNN 1,656  Shell 1,206  SACOR 3,332
SONAP 1,553  SN 1,204  SE 3,231
CP 1,491  Lisnave 1,126  CRGE 2,959
* Net worth is an important determinant of the value of a company, considering it is composed primarily of all the money that has 
been invested since its inception, as well as the retained earnings for the duration of its operation. It may be used to determine 
creditworthiness.
Source: Principais Sociedades (Lisbon, INE, 1972)
Tab.	3.	 Largest Portuguese non-financial firms in 1914
Firm Assets 
(103 escudos)
CP – Companhia dos Caminhos­de­Ferro Portugueses 73,367
CCFBA – Companhia dos Caminhos­de­Ferro Portugueses 
da Beira Alta
18,336
CAL – Companhia das Águas de Lisboa 14,451
CRGE – Companhias Reunidas de Gás e Electricidade 14,346
CNCF – Companhia Nacional de Caminhos­de­Ferro 8,914
CTP – Companhia dos Tabacos de Portugal 6,712
CCFP – Companhia de Carris de Ferro do Porto 6,294
Nacional – Nova Companhia Nacional de Moagem 6,033
CPF – Companhia Portuguesa de Fósforos 5,938
CUF – Companhia União Fabril 5,174
Source: Neves (2007), p. 373
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CPP and the maritime company SOPONATA (1947), the pulp and paper 
manufacturer CPC and the electric machinery producer EFACEC (1948), 
and the iron and steel SN (1955).
b. Seven had been created during the inter-war period – the food industry 
Nacional and the electricity producer UEP (1919), the maritime company 
CCN (1922), the cement producer ECL (1925), the tobacco manufacturer 
Tabaqueira (1927), the oil distributor SONAP (1933), and the oil refiner 
SACOR (1938).
c. Seven had been created before the First World War – the railway company CP 
(1860), the chemical industry CUF (1865), the water distributor CAL (1868), 
the maritime company CNN (1870), the gas and electricity CRGE and the 
tobacco manufacturer CTP (1891), and the cement manufacturer CCT (1894).
If the fact is taken into account that two firms which dated back to the 1960s 
– the electricity production CPE and the shipyards Lisnave – already featured 
in the list of largest firms of the early 1970s, it becomes clear that the period 
Tab.	4.	 Largest Portuguese non-financial firms (1948-1960)
Firm Sector Creation
CAL – Companhia das Águas de Lisboa Water distribution in lisbon 1868
CCN – Companhia Colonial de Navegação Maritime transportation 1922
CCT – Companhia de Cimentos Tejo Cement production 1894
CNN – Companhia Nacional de Navegação Maritime transportation 1870
CP – Companhia dos Caminhos­de­Ferro Portugueses Rail transportation 1860
CPC – Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose Paper and paper pulp 1948
CPP – Companhia dos Petróleos de Portugal Oil prospecting 1947
CRGE – Companhias Reunidas de Gás e Electricidade Gas and electricity distribution 
in lisbon
1891
CTP – Companhia dos Tabacos de Portugal Tobacco manufacturing 1891
CUF – Companhia União Fabril Chemical industry 1865
ECL – Empresa de Cimentos de Leiria Cement production 1925
EFACEC – Empresa Fabril de Máquinas Eléctricas Electric machinery production 1948
Nacional – Companhia Industrial de Portugal e Colónias Food industry 1919
SACOR – Sociedade Concessionária da Refinação  
de Petróleos
Oil refining 1938 
SN – Siderurgia Nacional Iron and steel 1955
SONAP – Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos Distribution of oil derivatives 1933
SOPONATA – Sociedade Portuguesa de Navios Tanques Maritime transportation 1947
Tabaqueira Tobacco manufacturing 1927
TAP – Transportes Aéreos Portugueses Air transportation 1945
UEP – União Eléctrica Portuguesa Electricity production 1919
Source: Tables 2 and 3. Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal
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under consideration and the 1960s were very favorable to newcomers in the 
population of large firms in Portugal.
The balance sheets and current accounts of most of the firms that belong to 
the sample identified were sourced in the archives of the Portuguese central 
bank, the Banco de Portugal. Unfortunately, there are no data available for 
EFACEC, SONAP, SOPONATA, and Tabaqueira. Thus, the sample of largest 
Portuguese firms used hereafter is reduced to 16 firms.
4. Scale
These firms were quite large in the Portuguese context. In 1950 the aggregate 
equity (share capital) of the sample represented 9% of the equity of all firms in 
the economy, and the average equity in the sample was 160 times the average 
equity of firms in Portugal. These ratios increased during the 1950s, especially 
due to the formation of the new iron manufacturer SN, and the privatization of 
the air company TAP12. In 1953, the first year for which Gdp is available and the 
mid-point of the period, the sampled firms (0.07% of the universe of 21,336 cor-
porate firms in the economy) assembled revenues amounting to 1% of Gdp, and 
the 12 industrial firms (0.3% of the universe of 5,107 industrial firms) aggre-
gate revenues amounting to 4.2% of the Industrial Gdp13. However, although 
the sampled firms were the top Portuguese units, they were small-scale firms 
by international standards. In 1956, for example, the last Usa firm ranked in 
Fortune 500, had six times the sales as the top selling Portuguese firm, SACOR.
If the annual revenues are taken as the major indicator for scale, the largest 
firm in 1948 was the electrical CRGE followed by the navigation CNN and 
the oil SACOR, all of them approaching 3 million dollars. The shipping CCN, 
the water-supply CAL and the rail CP were above 1 million dollars, followed 
by the food NACIONAL and the electrical UEP. All the remaining firms were 
below half a million dollars, as Figure 1 shows.
The varied degree of success led to some reversals in this ranking and to a 
particular hegemony of the oil SACOR with a clear take-off in the mid-1950s 
parallel to the newly-founded airline TAP.
For a general glimpse of the period, Figure 2 provides the average revenue of 
each of the firms in the 1947-1960 period, ranking them according to this 
criterion. 
12	Equity is the only variable available for the whole industry and economy. Estatísticas das Sociedades (Lisbon, 
INE, several years).
13	N. Valério (ed.), 2001, Table 10.6­B, p. 520.
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Fig.	1.	 Revenues
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Data on revenues is abundant, but the conclusions from these figures must 
be downgraded. As there was no harmonization in the way how corporations 
presented their accounts, the revenues criterion is unsafe and capital or equity 
are more reliable aspects. Note that lists of largest corporations in the mid-
twentieth century for other countries were constructed using mainly these 
indicators, for this same reason. So, if we take assets as the criterion for scale, 
the largest firm was, by far, the rail CP. The 1948 Report says that «CP is 
far and away the largest Portuguese firm, for the number of employees (over 
30,000), for the spread of collector and distribution centers (800 stations and 
stops) throughout the whole country, and for the volume of its budget»14. 
The company was connected with all economic sectors, and presented, as any 
railway firm, industrial complexity and commercial management, particularly 
to face the increasing competition from road transportation.
As Figure 3 shows, the electrical CRGE was the second largest firm in terms of 
assets, followed by the shipping companies CCN and CNN. Shipping was followed 
by the oil SACOR, soon outstripped by the success of the iron and steel SN. In 
spite of starting production so late, SN deserves to be present in the sample not only 
because of its capital-intensive character, but also because it was considered a vital 
producer in designing a Portuguese strategy for economic growth and development.
14	Page 7 of the annual Report of 1949, Historical Archive of the Banco de Portugal (AHBP). For a theoretical 
perspective, A. Chandler Jr., 1977, pp. 79­121.
Fig.	2.	 Average Revenue (1948-60)
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5. Scope
It is worth observing that, comparing this 1972 Portuguese sample of top 
firms with the American, British, German and French lists, there is an almost 
complete coincidence of sectors, with the exception of the automobile indu-
stries, which is not a top position in Portugal15. This was the rule in the 
small and less-developed European partners (with the exception of Volvo at 
Sweden). This fact is very significant for the scope of businesses, because it may 
be responsible for a larger complexity in the transfer process of the American 
business system to these countries (as Ford’s trajectory in automobile produc-
tion was a top channel for its diffusion)16.
The rise of the activities directly and indirectly linked to electricity and oil 
explains the modernity of the sectors and the openness to new management 
practices. These were two new sectors that everywhere were being developed, 
as they represented the spread of the new technologies that began shaping the 
world before WWI, but reached the peak of their use and application only after 
WWII17. In Portugal there were four large firms linked to the oil business: 
SACOR was an oil refiner, SONAP an oil-derivatives retailer, SOPONATA 
an oil-shipping manager, and CPP an oil prospector. Even LISNAVE, one 
of the rising-star firms created in the 1960s, was a ship repairer, whose main 
customers were tankers. There were three firms directly linked to electricity: 
EFACEC was a producer of electric machines, UEP a producer of electricity, 
and CRGE a distributor of gas and electricity, whose electricity component 
was gaining importance as against its gas component, which was clearly domi-
nant in the early days of the firm. Even the main foreign firms were linked 
either to oil (Mobil and Shell), or to electricity (Plessey and SE). The expan-
sion of cement producers, CCT and ECL, was also mainly the consequence 
of demand resulting from the peak of construction of dams for generating 
hydro-electric power.
At the same time, the Portuguese economy was catching up in some traditio-
nal industrial branches. The most important case was steel. The heavy iron-
industry firm SN (Siderurgia Nacional) was created in 1954 to lead off the 
Portuguese iron and steel sector. It started production only in 1961. In com-
parison with the world economic leaders, Portugal was late in the iron-steel 
sector, where «modern factory management was firstly fully worked out»18. 
15	Compare with M. Smith, 1998, pp. 46­85, 61, and with Fortune 500 several years.
16	On the Method­Time­Measurement system in the automobile production in the 1940s and the difficulties to 
apply it in Volvo, see M. Kipping and O. Bjanar, 1998, pp. 1­17 and 133­149.
17	N.L. Madureira, 2007, pp. 595­615.
18	A. Chandler Jr., 1977, p. 258.
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In the 1913-1919 period metals accounted for 20% of the largest firms in the 
Usa, 19% of those in Britain, 34% in Germany, and 34% of the largest firms 
in France19. 
The other half of Portugal’s largest firms were established in traditional 
industrial sectors dating back to the nineteenth century (food, tobacco, and 
chemicals), transportation (rail and shipping), and utilities (water supply), 
to which the new paper industry was added in the inter-war period, and air 
transportation was added at the beginning of the period under consideration.
6. Performance
Most of the firms in the sample were profitable. The exceptions were two 
public transportation companies, the rail CP and the air TAP, which routinely 
posted negative results and survived on the basis of government subsidies. 
Disregarding these two companies and also SN (for missing data), the aver-
age profit rate (defined as the ratio between profits and net worth) was in the 
8-12% range, as Figure 4 shows. 1953 and 1954 were difficult years from a 
domestic and global perspective.
19	A. Chandler Jr., 1990, Table 3.
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Figure 5 shows that the profit rates of some companies were in the range of 
3 to 10%, but one of the maritime transportation companies (CCN), the oil 
SACOR, the paper CPC, the tobacco CTP, the cement production CCT, and 
the chemical CUF, after 1955 were all above the 10% threshold.
The most stable profit-distribution firms were the traditional ones, the 
gas and electricity CRGE (from 3.3 to 5.1%), the tobacco CTP (from 12.4 
to 14.3%) and the food industry Nacional (from 8.0 to 10.3%). The more 
recent electrical UEP also showed stable profitability but at higher stand-
ards (from 7.2 to 10.8%). The oil refining SACOR moved from very high 
profit rates (about 30%) to high standards (above 10% to 15%), which means 
that after the early exceptionally favorable results, refining became a more 
normal business. The paper CPC was beginning its activity to provide news-
print and wrapping paper to the shopping market, and white paper later on, 
then having profits above 15%. The cement ECL posted modal (and irregu-
lar) profits between 5 and 10%, the same occurring with the other cement 
firm CCT which, however, increased its distribution by close to 15%. The 
water supply of Lisbon CAL was quite irregular. The chemical CUF had 
a positive trend from less than 5% to above 10%. The failed case was the 
oil prospector CPP, as no oil was discovered in national territories, in spite 
of the large prospection efforts that were developed in mainland Portugal 
and Timor, according to the annual reports of the company. In perform-
ing a highly risky sector, the company could not succeed commercially. As 
a consequence, prospecting was abandoned in 1963. The inclusion of the 
company in the sample, thanks to the presented methodology, stresses the 
fact that success and failure are the alternative results for business endeavors, 
and both must be considered.
The maritime transportation CCN saw a negative trend in the mid-1950s. 
CNN performed regularly, but the profit rates in 1953 and 1954 were hurt. 
According to the CNN annual reports, there was an East line (to Portuguese 
India, Macau and East Timor) that was unprofitable, and had to be supported 
by the Government, arguing for the public-service character of this line. The 
situation worsened when the political situation in Portuguese India deterio-
rated in the mid-1950s20: the number of voyages had to be increased, obliging 
the firm to re-allocate resources from more profitable lines to this «national» 
mission. 
Setting the rail CP and airline TAP aside, scale was important for performan-
20	Recall that Portuguese India was occupied by India in two steps: Dadrá and Nagar Aveli were occupied in 1954, 
and Goa, Damão and Diu were occupied in 1961.
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ce, as seen in Figure 6, which suggests a positive correlation between revenues 
and profits, as expected21.
As for performance, Chandler says that technological progress and appropriate 
organizational structure are the most decisive aspects for domination in any 
industrial sector22. Significant technological developments had not touched 
Portugal until WWII, while constraints to industry were evident in the scar-
city of laboratories, modern machinery and energy23. From the technological 
perspective, this was a period of significant innovation and sophistication in all 
these Portuguese firms, as their annual reports take care to mention, although 
firms depended on foreign technology most of the time.
Cement introduced new technologies, particularly new ovens. In 1958 CCT 
claimed to have the world’s largest cement oven in the Alhandra factory24. 
Shipping companies replaced old ships and bought modern ocean-going ves-
sels to connect the country to all continents, particularly destinations in the 
21	R. Whyttington, ibid., 50, 51. R. Giannetti and M. Vasta, 2006, p. 165.
22	A. Chandler Jr., 1990.
23	C.H. Sousa, 1948, pp. 4­37, 23­24, and 26.
24	Companhia de Cimentos Tejo, Annual Report, 1958, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal AHBP. E.F. 
Clemente, 2002, p. 11.
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Fig.	6.	 Average revenues and profits of top Portuguese firms (1947-60) 
Source: Annual Reports, 1947-1960, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal (AHBP). Missing values for CPP. Unit: Thousand 
dollars. 
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colonial empire and Brazil. All the modern and elegant ships that still remain 
in the passengers’ memory (cruiseliners such as the Pátria, Santa Maria, Vera 
Cruz and Infante Dom Henrique) were built at this time, mostly in Belgium. 
Air travel became the top technology of the time. TAP’s first aircraft were 
Skymasters, but in 1955 three Super Constellations were introduced for the 
line to Africa and three DC-3s for domestic and Iberian lines. The rail com-
pany electrified some lines and received new equipment, particularly diesel 
locomotives25. Chemical manufacturing adopted sophisticated technologies, 
namely in the nitrate fertilizers’ plant (Amoníaco Português SARL) located 
near Oporto, participated by CUF. The most striking technological improve-
ment, however, occurred in the electrical sector in building hydro-electric 
plants26 and infra-structures for electricity distribution. The effects on the 
cement sector were quite direct, as the needs of cement provision to these 
engineering projects required high output. The paper factory CPC was built in 
1952-1953 near Oporto with American equipment and technical assistance by 
the Albert E. Reed & Co, going into production in 195427. The water distribu-
tor CAL used Candy Filter Co technologies to smooth the flow in the water 
supply to the Portuguese capital city. The iron SN was built by a German/
Belgium consortium made up of the German Demag, Rhensthall and Still 
firms and the Belgium Sybetra. Engineers and labor force were trained in 
Germany. The Marshall Plan funding supported a significant part of this 
technological modernization in the 1940s-1950s28. According to the Reports 
to the Technical Commission of the European Commission Administration 
ECA, the hydro-electric equipment, the chemical industry (particularly CUF 
factories, Amoniaco Português and União Fabril do Azoto), the cement indus-
tries (ECL and CCT), the paper sector (Companhia Portuguesa de Celulose), 
the rail CP and the oil refining industries (Sacor and CPP), were supported29. 
According to Oeec reports «the Usa provided in the Marshall help a large part 
of the equipment» for the refining industry30.
25	Reports from the Technical Commission of the ECA, European Commission Administration on the Applications 
for release of counterpart funds including the Portuguese applications to the Counterpart Fund (Historical 
Archive of the Bank of Portugal (AHBP) box number 65), complaining about the old age of the existing rolling 
material: thirty locomotives were over 10 years old, 7 from 10 to 20 years, 137 from 21 to 30, 76 from 31 to 40, 
86 from 41 to 70, 41 from 51 to 60, 72 from 61 to 70, 34 from 71 to 80 and 23 over 80 years old.
26	Carrapatelo, Castelo de Bode and Salamonde dams were the most important.
27	Annual Reports of the Company, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal. See also J.F. Alves, 2000, pp. 
153­182.
28	M.F. Rollo, 1994.
29	Smaller firms also were supported. A good example is electrical machinery (Companhia Portuguesa de Fornos 
Eléctricos). Source: Reports to the Technical Commission of the European Commission Administration, ECA, 
on the use of the direct help, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal AHBP, box 67.
30	OEEC, p. 124.
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7. Ownership
In considering ownership, the largest Portuguese firms may be divided into 
four main categories, as inferred by data in annual reports and Martins (1975):
a. Those controlled or participated by the Mello family, usually known as 
the CUF group – CUF, CNN, EFACEC, SOPONATA and Tabaqueira 
(to which Lisnave, the shipbuilding firm created during the 1960s and 
already one of the largest Portuguese firms of the early 1970s might be 
added).
b. Those controlled by the Champalimaud family, usually known as the 
Sommer or Champalimaud group – the cement firms CCT and ECL, the 
food producer Nacional, and the iron and steel SN31. 
c. Those controlled or participated by the government – the rail company 
CP, the oil refining SACOR, distribution of oil derivatives SONAP and the 
airline company TAP.
d. Those controlled by other smaller business groups – including the water 
supplier CAL, the maritime company CCN, the paper manufacturer CPC, 
the oil prospector CPP, the gas and electricity-distribution in Lisbon 
CRGE, the tobacco manufacturer CTP, and the electricity producer UEP32. 
Government control of transportation and oil sector firms resulted from 
two different circumstances. In the case of transportation firms, they were 
non-profitable firms which were considered to provide decisive services: rail 
and the emerging new sector of air transportation. Maritime companies 
presented balanced accounts, but they also depended to a great extent on 
the government, because of public demand for transports to ensure the con-
nections among the various territories under Portuguese sovereignty. The oil 
firms were profitable, but it was intended that regulation and surveillance was 
necessary, because they were strategically decisive for the country’s security 
and economic growth.
Of course, the government assumed a central role in distributing the direct 
help and in electing who received the Marshall and government support, as 
the American administration included the country in the offer of the European 
Recovery Plan (ERP) along with the rest of Europe. Although the amount of 
$54 million in direct help and $18,3 million in indirect aid may be considered 
31	M.B. Martins, 1975, p. 100. For the iron and steel industry, H.P. Pereira, 1960. M.F. Rollo, 2005.
32	With links to the American ITT, according to M.B. Martins, 1975, pp. 33, 65. The Fonsecas & Burnay group also 
participated in the electric­machinery­production EFACEC.
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small, the Marshall Plan was an important source of subsidies33. Co-ordination 
of this distribution to private firms and public works gave rise to a special-
ized agency for this purpose (FFN, Fundo de Fomento Nacional). After the 
Marshall period, this agency, headed by the Minister of Finance, gave origin to 
the first Portuguese bank for investment, in 195934. At the same time, indica-
tive planning, under the form of lists of public investment for several years, was 
also implemented35. The government’s discretionary power of allocating scarce 
Marshall funding to alternative aims, choosing the industrial actors, trusting 
in certain companies that were elected for achieving the government’s targets 
and purposes, was an important factor in the consolidation and development 
of private groups. It may seem paradoxical that the champion of market rules 
and competition offered an instrument, the Marshall aid, which may be seen 
as an American impulse to cartelization and planning, particularly in small 
European partners36. 
This does not mean that the largest Portuguese business groups of the epoch 
emerged from the Marshall Plan or the government support during this 
period. As in other European countries they come from the past37. The CUF 
example is quite clear. The firm started as a soap and fats manufacturer in 
the 1860s and got into trouble during the 1880s. As another soap firm fell 
under the control of a bank (Banco Lusitano) that went into bankruptcy dur-
ing the early 1890s Baring crisis, it was purchased from the bankrupt bank 
by the entrepreneur Alfredo da Silva, who made it the basis of a diversified 
chemical firm. In the immediate post-WWI years, he used the firm as a basis 
to build a conglomerate to which were eventually added the Sociedade Geral 
de Comércio, Indústria e Transportes (a transportation firm) in 1919, the 
banking house José Henriques Totta and the Casa Gouveia (a colonial firm) in 
1921, the Tabaqueira (a tobacco firm) in 1927 and the Companhia Seguradora 
Império (an insurance company) in 1942. Around WWII, shipbuilding and 
repairing, insurance, electrical material, and oil transportation and refining 
were added to the scope of the group. In 1948, a subsidiary was created to 
33	Reports from the Technical Commission of the ECA, European Commission Administration on the Applications 
for release of counterpart funds including the Portuguese applications to the Counterpart Fund – AHBP boxes 
61, 65 and 67. N. Andresen­Leitão, 2003, p. 67.
34	Decree­Law nº 37354 of 26 March 1949 for the creation, Decree­Law nº 37724 of 2 January 1950 on the 
administration, and Decree­Law nº 41957 of 13 November 1959 for its transformation into an investment bank.
35	Portuguese indicative planning was much less sophisticated than indicative planning in other European 
countries at the time. See J. Klausen, 1998, pp. 45, 47, 101, 102, 108, 114­116, 149, 178, 195, 199, 251, 253, 
255, 258.
36	The total American help amounting to 15.6 billion dollars represented 4% of the European Gdp (excluding the 
regions under the soviet influence). For the Norwegian case see the role of the Norwegian Productivity Institute 
NPI and the policy for mergers at R. Amdam and O. Bjanar, 1998, pp. 91­111.
37	G. Jones, 2000.
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produce ammonium sulphate, the União Fabril do Azoto. In 1953, the bank-
ing house José Henriques Totta was transformed in the Bank Totta. During 
the 1960s, the group would diversify into unrelated businesses such as real 
estate, construction, hotels, restaurants, casinos and tourism, having its own 
hospital and its own project firms. It already involved more than 100 firms in 
1972 and developed international connections38.
As for the Sommer group, its roots went back to the activity of the entre-
preneur Henrique Sommer (1886-1944), owner of Casa Sommer and of 
an important firm of metallurgical manufacturing and trade (Vulcano & 
Colares). In the interwar period interests were focused on the rising cement 
manufacturing activities, becoming the leader of two important firms in the 
sector, ECT and CTT. After Sommer’s death, leadership of the group was 
taken over by his nephew, António Champalimaud, who became involved in 
unrelated-diversified business in starting up the Portuguese iron and steel firm 
SN, as well as the food industry NACIONAL, during the 1950s, and would 
extend his interests to the financial sector in 1961 (both to banking – Banco 
Pinto & Sotto Mayor – and insurance – Companhia de Seguros Mundial and 
Companhia de Seguros Confiança)39.
Other groups such as the Espírito Santo and Fonsecas & Burnay had financial 
origins: they started as banking firms in the nineteenth century and gradually 
obtained participation in some of the large industrial firms40.
8. Structure
In analyzing firms’ structures, Whittington and Mayer (2000) extend 
Chandler’s theory to a message coming from his disciples, a real school of busi-
ness thought, the Chandlerism, visualizing that multidivisional corporation «is 
a theory of economic development, in which economic progress more gener-
ally depends upon international acceptance of the efficiency, professionalism, 
and innovativeness of the large corporations» (p. 24). A perusal of Portuguese 
administration reports reveals that the largest Portuguese firms of the period 
under consideration were strictly functional (sector-specialized). CUF was a 
conspicuous exception to these rules, as it developed into a multidivisional-
holding firm (the M pyramid structure) by the end of the 1950s. In the 
38	For details on the CUF group see M.B. Martins, 1975, pp. 21­30.
39	For details on the Champalimaud group, see M.B. Martins, 1975, pp. 37­41 and J. Antunes, 1997.
40	For details about these and other smaller groups see M.B. Martins, 1975, pp. 43­65. For international 
comparisons R. Morck, 2005, pp. 2­10.
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immediate post-WWII years it already had chemical and shipyard divisions. 
In 1958 it was operationally decentralized in a divisional structure made up 
of Agricultural Goods, Fats and Soap, Industrial Goods, Metallic-Mechanics, 
Textiles, Shipbuilding and Repair, adding to functional departments of 
Finance, Research, and Social Services (including hospital care). The central-
ized managerial control was implemented in the cement and the electrical 
sectors, but only through functional divisions that included Production and 
Planning, Finance, Human Resources, Research and Juridical Questions. So, 
it is possible to say that personal ownership was not synonymous with anti-
divisional perspectives in Portugal. Other firms remained functional, or at 
least they did not announce any divisional control over decentralized opera-
tions structures in their annual reports. Note that the functional structure and 
the holding character of firms were also the dominant firm profiles elsewhere 
in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. According to Whittington and Mayer, 45% 
of the German firms and 56% of the French were functional, while 45% and 
44% were holding or functional-holding firms, respectively41. Only from the 
1960s onwards did European firms begin to adopt a divisional structure, but 
the ownership conditioned such a path, as firms under concentrated ownership 
were less likely to adopt the multi-divisional form and «state-owned firms were 
more likely to have resisted the multi-divisional»42. In France, particularly, 
families and entrepreneurs «dislike the decentralization and accountability 
involved» while in the UK «it does not seem that personal ownership interests 
offer significant opposition to the multidivisional anymore»43. 
Moreover, the Portuguese firms were small-scale firms by international 
standards. Structured in this way, it is possible to understand the connections 
among some firms, grouping through cross-share-holding in business groups, 
as a pursuit of scale structuring. The strength of economic groups did not 
involve the rise of formal or informal holdings (meaning holding or function-
al-holding firms). The group’s holding remained an informal family business.
As for managerial aspects, it seems clear that CEOs and Boards were made up 
of well-known names of the time, frequently educated (in any field, from Law 
to Engineering, Commercial Administration, or Finance). In family-owned 
firms the rule was to have a president from the family and invited adminis-
trators44. The chemical CUF group belonging to the Mello family and the 
cement production ECL and CTT belonging to the Champalimaud group are 
41	R. Whittington and M. Mayer, 2000, pp. 164, 168, and 174.
42	Ivi, p. 209.
43	Ivi, p. 203.
44	As was usual in British family businesses. G. Jones, 2000, p. 196.
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excellent examples. It is frequent that annual reports express regret over one or 
more deaths among the administrators or the upper staff of the firms, meaning 
that long experience, aged respectability, or past political functions providing 
good political relationship with the political regime were praised values.
This model seems to have been replaced by one of executive education from 
the mid-1950s on. Two aspects deserve to be mentioned. The studies that are 
available for this period attribute a large role to a new generation of econo-
mists from the mid-1950s on, and death regrets or reference to the long years 
of service and personal devotion to the firm, even in illness, and until the last 
moment of life, become unusual. This new generation of CEOs was conscious 
of the benefits of reaping scale and scope economies for modern industrial 
enterprises in producing for larger markets, and strongly influenced the politi-
cal regime (and Prime Minister Salazar) to open the Portuguese economy to 
foreign competition and join the European Free Trade Association45. They 
were a first wave of graduates from the Lisbon High Institute of Economic 
and Financial Studies following the 1949 curricula reform that made teaching 
and training much more modern46. The eclectic traditional teaching based on 
classical and institutional views, ideologically dominated by corporatism phi-
losophies was replaced by neoclassical microeconomics and Keynesian theories 
that were fully taught, while a second school of Economics was created in 
Oporto, the northern Portuguese industrial pole, in 195347. Most of these 
new graduates got jobs in the largest firms, participated in the departments of 
research and strategy, as well as in the investment bank (Banco de Fomento 
Nacional), or in the government central department for planning. The CUF 
leader (Jorge de Mello, a founder’s grandchild) also graduated in the Institute 
at this time and recruited many of his colleagues to head the CUF divisions48.
In comparison with other European countries, Portugal was late in adopting 
the modern American entrepreneurial structure49. The American consultancy 
firms were main actors in recommending and spreading the American firm 
model in the large European countries, particularly Britain, Germany and 
France, as well as in the small Northern-European partners: Consultancy firms 
«were powerful advocates of the reorganization of European businesses into 
multi-divisional, or M-form structures»50. According to McKenna (2006), by 
45	F.P. de Moura, 1969.
46	N. Valério (ed.), 1990, p. 425.
47	Decree nº 39227 from 28 May 1953. C. Bastien, 2001.
48	The only available study is A.A. Caetano, unpublished paper (CD­rom, XXIII Annual Meeting of the Portuguese 
Economic and Social History Association, 2003.
49	A. Chandler Jr., 1990, p. 621.
50	G. Jones and P. Miskell, 2005, pp. 113­139. R. Whittington and M. Mayer, 2000, p. 74.
143
large portuguese firms from the marshall plan to efta
the early 1970s the American consultancy firms had «decentralized most of 
the large companies in Europe», with the exception of Spain. Only then, when 
«the market was saturated» with their consultancy services, could they «no 
longer casually turn down marginal European clients»51. Portugal, as well as 
Spain, belongs to this last group of European clients. In the annual reports the 
first reference to American consultancy firms at work with Portuguese firms is 
found in 1972, although it is usually said that Mackinsey started its rendering 
of services in Portugal (to CUF) in 197052. 
Training of Portuguese economists at Harvard also began only in the 1970s. 
It is worth mentioning, however, a student from Portugal registered in 195153. 
So, improved managerial abilities were changing in Portuguese firms from the 
mid-1950s on, although mainly by better domestic training of Portuguese 
economists.
9. Strategy
Firms’ co-operation with the government may be seen as a strategy for their 
survival in an environment of domestic and international predatory compe-
tition at the ground level of development. First of all, a co-operative game 
between government and firms was at work. Government intended to maxi-
mize the longevity of the political regime, in promoting the administration, 
sovereignty and economic growth of the country and its empire, while firms 
wished to maximize their profits and enlarge their businesses in the historical 
context of the available opportunities54. The application to subsidies is a good 
example, namely in the Marshall Plan context. In such a small and less-deve-
loped country (as Portugal was in the 1940s) there was a small pool of firms 
in each industrial sector, most of them having a family-business character. As 
in auction mechanics, the proposals of the strongest candidates (those which 
had proven their industrial expertise and effectiveness for implementing the 
government’s aims for the sector) assumed the role of the highest bid and bid-
der in the spectrum of project proposals. Note that if a business has positive 
externalities for the economy, a socially optimal outcome may be possible if 
the subsidy compensates the positive externality resulting from the move of the 
51	C.	McKenna,	2006,	pp.	186-187.
52	Standard Electrica annual report, 1972, Historical Archive of the Bank of Portugal (AHBP) quoting Arthur 
Andersen & Co. 
 McKinsey began consulting in Portugal in 1973­1975, http://diferencial.ist.utl.pt/edicao/24/galamba.htm 
(accessed 20 October 2007), (re)opening office in Lisbon in 1985. E.H. Edersheim, 2004, pp. 95, 252.
53	Information from the Harvard Business School Academic Historical Archives.
54	P.C. Ordeshook (ed.), 1978.
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supply curve to the right55: having cement available for the construction of a 
government-planned hydroelectric plant (such as Castelo de Bode for example), 
may explain the attribution of funding to a cement-making sector.
The strategic aspects for the Portuguese firms seem mostly to fall into the 
realm of solving the «domestic market / colonial market / European market» 
equation, which represented the main challenge of the time. The point is that 
by 1950 Portugal had fewer than 10 million people and a Gdp of around 1.5 
billion dollars, the empire amounted to more 15 million people and less than 
0.5 billion dollars, but the OECE zone provided a market with 320 million 
people and a Gdp of 1 trillion dollars56. However, to tap into the OECE mar-
ket implied shifting from an import-substitution strategy that was dominant 
in Portugal, and almost everywhere, to an export-lead strategy for a free-trade 
zone involving the whole OECE. 
Protection of the domestic market was ensured by rather high tariffs, and a 
system of entry barriers (Condicionamento Industrial) for new producers that 
had been created in 1926 and enlarged in 1931 to fight firms’ failures and 
unemployment in the context of the Great Depression, but which survived 
until the post WWII years, considering that competition was not always 
benign57. The established producers benefited from this constraint against new 
domestic producers, a factor very favorable to domestic large firms’ strategies. 
Of course a different perspective must be referred in considering the long-run 
national growth and modernization, under a counterfactual earlier-liberaliza-
tion hypothesis.
In spite of the small mainland territory, firms could interact with the colonies 
in many ways. The CUF, Champalimaud, Fonsecas & Burnay and Espírito 
Santo groups were quite connected to the African empire. As for the CUF, 
connections with African territories dated back from at least the 1920s. 
Tropical oils were used for vegetable food fats, soap and detergents produc-
tion in competition with the multinational branch of Unilever Portugal58, and 
African fibers were used for producing bags to pack its own fertilizers (or to 
be sold to other industrial sectors, particularly cement). Cement subsidiary 
factories were at work in the two large colonies of Angola and Mozambique, 
through acquiring and improving a cement factory in 1944 in Mozambique, 
55	J. Gruber, 2005, p. 130.
56	R.T. Guerra, 1959, pp. 71­93.
57	J.M.B. de Brito, 1989; J. Confraria, 1992.
58	For the soap/detergent production at the CUF by the affiliated SONADEL (Sociedade Nacional de Detergentes), 
see M.B. Martins, 1975, p. 93. For Indústrias Lever Portuguesa (Unilever Portugal), belonging to the Dutch 
Unilever, G. Jones, 2005.
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and creating a cement factory in Angola in 1949. SACOR had an affiliated 
refiner in Angola, ANGOL, which was reorganized in 1956. In one way or 
another all large firms participated in the government policy of settlement to 
implement the Portuguese sovereignty and administrative rule over the whole 
empire in creating jobs, trade networks and multiplier effects. However, in 
spite of imperial preference schemes, there was no free trade, or monetary 
union between Portugal and its colonial empire. This reduced the impact of 
the colonial link for the Portuguese economy in general.
Other family groups such as Espírito Santo and Fonsecas & Burnay had finan-
cial origins in banking and insurance and obtained participation in some of 
the large industrial firms. Espírito Santo’s strategy illustrates the related and 
unrelated product-diversification strategy, as it included the oil sector both in 
the mainland SACOR and the colonial affiliates, as well as colonial real estate 
and small local firms59. Literature indicates that it is possible to maximize 
performance along dimensions such as horizontal diversification, vertical inte-
gration, and group heterogeneity in the presence of a group-specific banking 
institution. Intra-group coordination, given the extensive cross-ownership ties 
among member firms in different industries, or liquidity smoothing through 
intra-group transfers among group members, may enable investment smooth-
ing, which does not necessarily lead to smoother profit rates. It also happens 
that risk sharing is especially important in periods of shocks, and the interven-
tion of the group’s bank can assist distressed firms in their inability to meet 
fixed obligations or fulfill investment plans, bringing important advantages 
for any firm to belong to a financial-origin group, particularly in the presence 
of capital market imperfections, which are so prevalent in small economies. 
Credit-constrained firms have to rely on adequate internally available resources 
or within-business-group internal capital markets, which may provide the best 
solution. Such constraints are especially severe in emerging markets, a condi-
tion that prevailed in the Portuguese economy throughout these decades60. 
As for the European market, plans for a free trade area among the member 
countries of Oeec were put forward during the 1950s, but failed. Portugal, as 
a relatively less-developed country, feared participation in a free trade area with 
highly developed European partners, but accepted in principle to become a 
member with some restrictions, contrary to other countries in the same situa-
tion – Greece, Ireland, Iceland, and Turkey. However, Portugal was opposed 
to any customs union and economic sharing of colonial territories, such as 
59	C. Damas, 2004.
60	T. Khanna and Y. Yafeh, 2005.
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those put forward in the context of the emerging European Communities. In 
practical terms the Portuguese European policy «was similar to other British-
led Oeec members»61.
The contradiction between benefiting from colonial endeavors and aiming at 
a European partnership in the ongoing integration process was a paramount 
issue. Large firms were supportive of the European idea, as were big busines-
ses in all other countries, but also supportive of colonial businesses62. So it is 
understandable that in the firms’ annual reports, boards expressed the need 
for implementing a free trade area among Portugal and its overseas posses-
sions, a goal that began to be implemented in 1960, while also frequently 
expressing their hopes in the early steps toward European integration.
The compromise of the 1960s was to join a free trade zone in Europe, the 
European Free Trade Association, and create another free trade zone including 
Portugal and her empire. The European free-market zone EFTA , headed by 
the UK and including Portugal, was only an inter-government entity, side by 
side with the supra-national entity of the European Communities, an impor-
tant distinction in terms of sovereignty. After two decades of protectionism 
thanks to the government policy of Condicionamento Industrial, Portuguese 
firms were already robust enough to face some foreign competition. Moreover, 
a special statute was negotiated with the European Free Trade Association 
partners in 1959 in Annex G of the Stockholm agreement. EFTA  was a 
success, proving the Portuguese firms’ ability to enter large-demand markets, 
while the so-called Portuguese economic space collapsed in the early 1970s. 
The more open was the Portuguese economy thanks to alleviating protection 
and the rules of the Condicionamento Industrial, the more impressive was 
growth, urbanization and modernization, as Table 5 shows.
The stagnant urbanization rate of 14% in the 1930s-1940s improved dramati-
cally to 23-26% in the 1950s and 1960s, and rose to over 30% thereafter, while 
total population stagnated, due to the appeal of jobs in the European labor 
markets (especially France, and Germany). Such an urbanization rate respond-
ed to the decline of jobs in agriculture, which was particularly important after 
joining EFTA  (from 43% in the 1960 Census, this sector declined to 33% 
in 1970). Finally, Portugal signed a free trade agreement with the European 
Communities in 1972 and employment in agriculture declined again (this 
time to 19%), while in industry it improved to 44% and in services to 37 % 
(1981 Census). The European market became, after several hesitations, the 
61	N.	Andresen-Leitão,	2003,	p.	13.
62	For multinationals this is clear in G. Jones and P. Miskell, 2005, pp. 116­117.
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definitive strategic option of the Portuguese economy, following those days 
when the government umbrella had been a decisive support. The issue cannot 
be studied properly without considering the decisions of the 1940s. Although 
it is often overlooked, Portugal’s acceptance of the Marshal Plan was a crucial 
move in the country’s long-run business policy.
10. Conclusion: a Portuguese pattern?
For many years Portuguese propaganda suggested that the ERP had been a 
minor episode, and many people ignored the fact that in receiving the aid, 
Portugal also gained admittance to the European Economic Community 
(EEC). The Marshall Plan represented a very important step in the definition 
of Portugal’s long-run alliance with the Usa, Nato and overall European inte-
gration. In fact, accepting ERP aid was a watershed event in leading Portugal 
towards the European post-war negotiations and international openness, in 
general. 
In an international context it is worth observing that the Portuguese experi-
ence in the period going from the Marshall Plan to EFTA  does not fit per-
fectly into the general pattern of growth through business diversification and 
multidivisional firm. This means that Chandler’s pre-condition of large three-
pronged investment in production, distribution and management, requiring 
a strong socialization of modern capitalism in the society, was not met63. Is it 
63	A. Chandler Jr., 1990.
Tab.	5.	 Macroeconomic indicators for the Portuguese economy
Year Population* Urban 
Population**
Urbanization 
Rate (%)
Labor Force 
in the Primary 
Sector (%)
Labor Force 
in Industry 
(%)
Labor Force 
in the Tertiary 
Sector (%)
1911 6004 715 12 57 25 18
1920 6084 779 13 ? ? ?
1930 6812 946 14 51 22 27
1940 7758 1095 14 53 24 23
1950 8512 1964 23 49 28 23
1960 8891 2285 26 43 33 24
1970 8657 2679 31   33 33 34
1981 9884 3496 35 19 44 37
* Thousands of persons
** Thousands of persons living in centers above 10 thousand people
Sources: M.E. Mata and N. Valério, 2003, Statistical Appendix.
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possible to identify a Portuguese pattern – in comparison with other econo-
mies during the same period or during similar processes?
The Portuguese case illustrates the importance in the 1940s and 1950s of 
three factors coming together for implementing business groups and industrial 
growth. One was the opportunity to benefit from favorable post-WWII foreign 
markets and colonial sources of raw-material; the second was the availability of 
an initial stimulus through financial support coming from the Marshall aid; 
and the third was the government commitment to promote economic growth 
through targeted achievements and planning using new industrial sectors 
(electricity, oil, and iron and steel among others) and implementing regulation, 
more precisely, entry barriers. Such a convergence of factors strengthened firms 
and family businesses in groups that behaved as first movers in the Portuguese 
twentieth-century modernization, a case scenario that does not fit into the 
Chandlerian pattern performed by the «competitive managerial capitalism» of 
the Usa, the «personal capitalism» of the UK dispersed ownership, the co-oper-
ative cartelization model in Germany, or even less the multinational precocious 
capitalism of other small but developed European countries (such as Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavia)64. As far as government is so 
involved in regulation, entry barriers, principal-agency decisions for the alloca-
tion of subsidies, and even public provision, the so-called «political capitalism» 
that prevailed in Mediterranean countries (particularly in Spain and Italy) may 
be recalled65. Similarities with these countries, however, deserve to be carefully 
examined. It may be confidently said that political impulses in core sectors were 
designed to overcome under-development «as a Gerschenkronian substitutive 
factor», but the success in implementing huge conglomerates under a unified 
control of state-owned holdings by specialized government agencies such as 
the INI in Spain or the IRI in Italy cannot be claimed66. On the contrary, in 
Portugal groups were the way to enhance business opportunities in a small 
economy facing the international post-war context. As informal agglomerations 
of firms, established from firm-to-firm connections, the successful performance 
they reaped, both in terms of profitable businesses in a microeconomic perspec-
tive, and domestic economic growth in a macroeconomic perspective, lead us 
to consider that they were main actors of the Portuguese industrialization and 
integration in the European Free Trade Association.
Although Chandler’s Scale and Scope supports the superior character of diver-
64	A. Chandler Jr., 1990, pp. 47­592. R. Whittington and M. Mayer, 2000, p. 94. N.M. Kay, 2002, pp. 199­207. 
65	A. Franco, 1997; R. Giannetti and M. Vasta, 2006. A. Carreras and X. Tafunell, 1993, pp. 127­175).
66	F. Amatori, 1997, p. 3. 
149
large portuguese firms from the marshall plan to efta
sifying under a related-business strategy, empirical studies for less-developed 
regions do not confirm that this is the only rational strategy67. Unrelated diver-
sification may be a first-step strategy in business, «contrary to the wisdom, 
conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses 
profitability»68. Groups composed of several unrelated businesses (conglom-
erates) may respond better to competitive shocks by having the possibility 
of weighting the relative importance of each business in the group through 
restructuring or providing mutual assistance by reallocating resources among 
affiliates, minimizing risks thanks to the diversified character of businesses69. 
Moreover, the operating profitability variance is lower for group-affiliated 
companies than unaffiliated firms, because group firms whose profits are 
very low can obtain inexpensive inputs and other forms of group assistance, 
so that their profitability may not be as low as it would have been otherwise. 
The British created diversified business groups to operate in developing coun-
tries in the nineteenth century, many of which survived into the 1980s and 
beyond70. They were «robust forms of business organization […] in the condi-
tions of the booming world economy before 1914. […] Then and afterwards 
they provided a mechanism for information gathering, interpretation, and 
dissemination between collections of firms»71. Interdisciplinary studies show 
they continue to flourish up to the present day in Europe as well72. Joining a 
group (through mergers, acquisitions or shareholding partnerships) provided 
more safety and offered more insurance functions73. Membership could there-
by offer more stability by belonging to a larger organization where mutual 
arrangements were possible. So, «diversified business groups dominate the 
private sectors of most of the world’s economies»74. Conglomerates perform 
quite well and respond better to high transaction costs, inadequacy of services 
or inefficient enforcement of contracts, typical of emergent markets, «although 
a strategy of diversification to reduce risk is thoroughly unfashionable in a 
climate in which focus in “core” products is regarded as the optimal business 
strategy»75. Diversified-business groups were certainly the result of strong 
67	G. Jones, 2000.
68	T. Khanna and J. Rivkin, 2001, pp. 45­74, 45, in studying 14 currently emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Turkey).
69	P. Ghemawat and T. Khanna, 1998, pp. 35­61, 35. A. Chandler Jr., 1977, p. 482.
70	G. Jones, 2000.
71	Ivi, p. 194.
72	G. Jones and T. Khanna, 2006, pp. 453­477, 457. T. Khanna and R. Fisman, 2004, pp. 609­628. For Europe 
see R. Whittington and M. Mayer, 2000, pp. 87­121. 
73	T.K. McCraw, 1988, p. 376.
74	T.	Khanna,	and	K.G.	Palepu,	2000,	pp.	268-285,	as	a	case	study	for	the	1988-1996	Chilean	groups.
75	G.	Jones,	2000,	p.	348.
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market imperfections, in the past or even today: «Focus is good advice in New 
York or London, but something important gets lost in translation when that 
advice is given to groups in emerging markets»76. Surely firms’ stability and 
success are useful to all stakeholders for maximizing joint-utility. Both the 
employees, managers and shareholders have benefits if negative outcomes can 
be smoothed77. 
Chandler’s contribution may seem overrated in this paper. His analysis does 
not always apply and each country has got its own path to economic develop-
ment, which often shows original features, and very few countries fit perfectly 
into the general pattern of growth through business diversification and mul-
tidivisional firm. 
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